Weller, Cass. “Fallacies in the Phaedo Again.” Archiv für die Geschichte der Philosophie, Vol. 77 (1995): 121-34. Reprinted in Essays on Plato’s Psychology, ed. Ellen Wagner, Lexington, 2001.
Treatments of the final argument for the immortality and imperishability of the soul in the Phaedo (102a – 107b10) generally divide into two sorts. According to one, (A), an individual soul is an immanent character of the form Soul. It is a unit property or trope which mediates between the universal and the concrete individual of common sense. On the other view, (B), the soul is, to put it anachronistically, a Cartesian substance. An individual soul is the subject of psychological attributes such as thought, perception and desire and coincides with what is ordinarily thought to be a person or Cartesian ego.