Distinguishing Situated Knowledge and Standpoint Theory: Defending the Achievement Thesis

Original accounts of feminist standpoint theory emphasize its fundamentally critical stance
toward situated knowledge (Smith 1974; Hartsock 1983; Collins 1986). The function of a
critical standpoint is not to carelessly accept the beliefs of marginalized people, but instead to
interpret those beliefs in light of thoroughgoing and pervasive ideological distortions. Some
formulations of standpoint theory capture this critical function in the achievement thesis. It
claims that a standpoint is not obtained automatically but must be achieved through a
struggle against a dominant ideology. Contrary to the standard acceptance of the
achievement thesis, Bright has recently argued that the requirement of achievement can
warrant the dogmatic exclusion of some perspectives from becoming standpoints. In turn, he
advances an account of standpoint theory which abandons the achievement thesis. Against
Bright’s non-achievement account of standpoint theory, I argue that doing away with the
achievement thesis abandons standpoint theory’s original aim of being critical of the social
structures which construct and legitimize situated knowledge. Further, I argue that Bright’s
concern with the possible dogmatism of the achievement thesis is better addressed by a
commitment to the classic account of standpoint theory rather than a revision of it.