Two Arguments for Animal Immortality

Hereth, Blake. "Two Arguments for Animal Immortality." In Heaven and Philosophy, edited by Simon Cushing. Lexington Books (2018): 171-200.

I offer two arguments for the conclusion that all sentient animals who are not moral agents are immortal under all classical theisms like Hinduism, Islam, Judaism, and Christianity, in which it is true that any and all divine beings are perfectly good. The first argument proceeds as follows: for every possible animal of the above kind, that animal is such that it could have existed in a world in which it was biologically immortal. Because none of these animals are moral agents, their lack of biological immortality in the actual world (if indeed they lack it in the actual world) is a harm they suffer through no fault of their own. A general principle of commonsense morality is that it is unjust for individuals to suffer harms through no fault of their own, and this entails that animal mortality is (under classical theism) presumptively morally wrong to permit or bring about. The second argument is that some animals in the actual world suffer harm through no fault of their own, including immense and unimaginable suffering at the hands of human beings. Another general principle of commonsense morality is this: individuals who are unjustly harmed should be compensated. As no harmed animals are sufficiently compensated in this life, they ought (under classical theism) to be compensated in the next life. Moreover, it would be wrong to restrict opportunities to avoid future harm to those who have experienced past harm, which implies that both previously harmed and previously unharmed animals should be immortal. 

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