“A History of Metaethics and Values in Science.”

Franco, Paul L. Forthcoming.  “A History of Metaethics and Values in Science.” Tsou, Jonathan Y., Shaw, Jamie, and Fehr, Carla (eds.). Values, Pluralism, and Pragmatism: Themes from the Work of Matthew J. Brown. Boston Studies in the Philosophy and History of Science. Cham: Springer.

I pursue Matt Brown’s (2020) and James Leach’s (1968a) historical suggestions that there is a relationship between metaethical noncognitivism and certain arguments for the value neutrality of the sciences. In particular, I relate C.L. Stevenson’s emotivism to arguments by Herbert Feigl, Carl Hempel, and Ernest Nagel for the sciences’ value neutrality. I also consider whether these arguments can be disentangled from their controversial metaethical claims by looking at Robert Alexander’s (1974) account of value neutrality based on the view that a scientist’s aims are discharged by making empirical statements. Drawing upon Leach’s (1968a; 1969b) defense of the argument from inductive risk, I argue Alexander fails to offer a metaethically neutral version of the value neutrality of the sciences. Though I do not explicitly explore this, I think the history I sketch is relevant to recent calls for philosophers of science to more fully characterize the ‘values’ in ‘values and science.’

Status of Research
Forthcoming
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